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: Taxation--Fourth Circuit Disallows Leaseback Deductions
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 78

Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, dissented on the ground that arrests should be subject to the same
requirements with regard to warrants as searches.
The Court also reversed the ninth circuit's ruling that the
search was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances rule
set forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). The
Court in deciding Schneckloth distinguished the facts in that case
from a situation in which the consent to search was given while the
defendant was in custody, and declined to make a determination
of the proper standard to be applied in such a case. The Court here
clearly ruled that the Schneckloth "totality of the circumstances"
test would be applied even when the defendant was in custody at
the time of the consent. United States v. Watson, 96 S. Ct. 820
(1976).
J.P.B.

TAXATION-FOURTH CIRCUIT DISALLOWS
LEASEBACK DEDUCTIONS
In a significant tax case, Perry v. U.S., 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir.
1975), the fourth circuit has ruled that rental payments made by
two physician-taxpayers for the use of a medical building, which
they had previously transferred to trusts for the benefit of their
children, were not deductible under section 162(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The physicians, partners in a medical partnership, created a
"Clifford Trust" under sections 671-678 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Later each conveyed to the trust under essentially
the same terms his half interest in some property upon which they
had constructed an office building for their practice. The same
bank was named as corporate trustee with broad administrative
powers, and each physician-taxpayer was the settlor to whom the
remainder interests were reserved upon expiration of the trust or
the death of the beneficiaries, whichever should occur first.
A leaseback of the office building was arranged prior to establishing the trust whereby each taxpayer leased a one-half interest
in the building with monthly rent of $200 to be paid for the duration of each respective trust. The intended effect of this leaseback
arrangement, of course, was to divert a part of each taxpayer's
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income to his children as rent via the trust while at the same time
deducting the rental payments as ordinary and necessary business
expenses.
The other circuits have split on this issue. The fifth circuit has
held in Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965)
that similar rental payments were not deductible, while the seventh circuit in Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1944) allowed the deduction.
The district court in Perry had followed the Skemp case as
controlling and allowed the deduction largely on the grounds that
the independence of the corporate trustee was firmly established.
Perry v. U.S., 376 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.C. 1974). The district court
also looked to the fact that the rental payments made by the
taxpayer-physicians were for the use of the property and did not
enlarge their ownership. Additionally, the district court rejected
the government's contention that since the taxpayers retained an
equity in the property they were precluded from deducting the
rental payments under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.
The fourth circuit, however, reversed the district court and
chose instead to apply the Van Zandt case which it characterized
as being "in its essential elements, identical to the instant transactions." Perry v. U.S., 520 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1975). The court
regarded the fact that in Van Zandt the taxpayer himself was
named as trustee as inconsequential while at the same time deeming the "independence" of the corporate trustee in Perry as "illusory." In disallowing the deduction the court viewed the creation
of the trust and the leaseback as a single transaction and held that
as a whole the obligation to pay rent was not an ordinary and
necessary expense motivated by a real business purpose.
W.W.P.
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